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This article examines the takeover of the Perm-36 Gulag museum as emblematic of the dynamics of 
patriotic legitimation in Russia. The museum was dedicated to preserving the memory of the victims of 
Soviet political repression and it grew in popularity into the 2000s, emerging as an opposition platform 
and target for self-styled patriots who accused it of distorting Soviet history. The regional government 
soon joined the battle, finally forcing the museum’s takeover and transforming it into a site honoring the 
Gulag rather than its victims. Drawing on interviews conducted with the museum’s former director and 
scientific directors in 2015 and extensive local press materials, this analysis of the struggle over Perm-36 
demonstrates the significance of patriotism in sustaining the regional government’s attacks even in the 
absence of federal patronage. The findings thus challenge prevailing understandings of authoritarian 
regime politics as driven primarily by patronage and power-maximizing elites.  
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Patriotism without Patriots? Perm-36 and Patriotic Legitimation in Russia 
 
When do ideas matter in autocratic politics? Much of the contemporary scholarship on 
authoritarian and hybrid regime dynamics focuses less on legitimation than on stability and control, 
usually understood in terms of some mix of patronage, coercion, elite consensus, public opinion 
management.1 Lost in such approaches is the role of ideational power, or the non-material bases of 
regime legitimacy that remain consequential even when the flow of patronage slows to a trickle.2 To 
some extent, these concerns are addressed by scholars working on political culture, political psychology, 
symbolic politics, and political discourse.3  
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1 Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York, 2014); 
Vladimir Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes (Pittsburgh, 2015). 
2 For recent exceptions that examine legitimation in autocracies, see: Johannes Gerschewski, “Legitimacy in 
Autocracies: Oxymoron or Essential Feature?” Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 3 (2018): 652–65; Alexander 
Dukalskis and Johannes Gerschewski, “What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four 
Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation,” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 3 (2017): 251–68; Nelli Babayan, “Bearing 
Truthiness: Russia’s Cyclical Legitimation of Its Actions,” Europe-Asia Studies 69, no. 7 (2017): 1090–1105; Diana T. 
Kudaibergenova, “Compartmentalized Ideology and Nation-Building in Non-Democratic States,” Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 52, no. 3 (2019): 247–57; Kelly M. McMann, “Developing State Legitimacy: The Credibility 
of Messengers and the Utility, Fit, and Success of Ideas,” Comparative Politics 48, no. 4 (2016): 538–56; Derek S. 
Hutcheson and Bo Petersson, “Shortcut to Legitimacy: Popularity in Putin’s Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 7 
(2016): 1107–26.  
3 Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s New Authoritarianism and the Post-Soviet Political Ideal,” Post-Soviet Affairs 25, no. 1 
(2009): 66–92; Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Neil Munro, Popular Support for an Undemocratic Regime: The 
Changing Views of Russians (New York, 2011); Graeme Gill, Building an Authoritarian Polity (New York, 2015); 
Stephen Whitefield, ed., Political Culture and Post-Communism (Basingstoke, 2005); Samuel Greene and Graeme 
Robertson, “Agreeable Authoritarians: Personality and Politics in Contemporary Russia,” Comparative Political 
Studies 50, no. 13 (2017): 1802–34; Regina Smyth, Anton Sobolev, and Irina Soboleva, “A Well-Organized Play: 
Symbolic Politics and the Effect of  the Pro-Putin Rallies,” Problems of Post-Communism 60, no. 2 (2013): 24–39; 
Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, “Monumental Politics: Regime Type and Public Memory in Post-Communist 
States,” Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 3 (2011): 269–88; Graeme Gill, Symbolism and Regime Change in Russia (New 
York, 2013); Edward Schatz, “The Soft Authoritarian Tool Kit: Agenda-Setting Power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” 
Comparative Politics 41, no. 2 (2009); Michael Urban, Cultures of Power in Post-Communist Russia: An Analysis of 
Elite Political Discourse (New York, 2010). 
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This article expands upon these approaches in taking up a theoretical framework that explains 
regime legitimation in terms of the nationalist practices used by post-Soviet authoritarian regimes to 
regulate relations among elites and opposition. The advantage of this approach is that it recognizes that 
non-instrumental action is consequential and requires explanation. Nationalism is a convenient source 
of legitimation among authoritarian states in Eurasia, and the authorization or endorsement of 
nationalist practice by incumbent rulers generates distinctive political dynamics. In today’s Russia, these 
dynamics may either be a calculated, patronage-based form of elite politics that sustains elite 
commitment to regime maintenance under the cover of patriotism (patriotism without patriots), or an 
idealized, normative form of patriotism that sustains and mobilizes regime subordinates in the name of 
preserving order but also emboldens opposition in exposing the gap between the formally democratic 
political order and authoritarian realities (patriotism without patronage).  
Patriotism is treated here as a power-conserving form of nationalism. In his landmark study, 
Michael Billig notes that nationalism and patriotism are fundamentally similar phenomena, the 
difference being that nationalism is generally seen as dangerous and extreme while patriotism is 
perceived as beneficial, necessary, and quintessentially represents one’s own nation.4 Similarly, 
natsionalizm in today’s Russia has become synonymous with extremism, while nationalist state policies 
– such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 – are justified and celebrated in terms of patriotizm. Hence, 
most Russians would consider calling the Kremlin nationalist to be nonsensical. By contrast, patriotism is 
unambiguously celebrated in the media and public politics while Russian citizens have complex and 
often contradictory understandings of patriotism in their daily lives.5 This makes patriotism a useful 
resource for generating loyalty and seeking advancement within the regime, though the ways that 
 
4 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, 1995). 




regime subordinates connect patriotism with political action can be unpredictable or even dangerous for 
maintaining power. Likewise, patriotism may be invoked to challenge the regime’s claim to legitimacy by 
opposition actors, capitalizing on multivocal, quotidian understandings of patriotism and the perceived 
hollowness of official patriotic claims. 
A case study of the Perm-36 museum demonstrates these political dynamics, from the 
emergence of the museum as an opposition platform to its take-over by the regional government. Of 
course, there are multiple, overlapping social and political contexts that potentially confer meaning 
upon the possession of, or access to, patronage resources. While it can be difficult to isolate the 
influence of those contexts, Perm’s status as a relatively prosperous, loyal, and ethnically Russian region 
makes it reasonable to rule out the kinds of sub-national cleavages that were characteristic of regional 
political conflicts in Russia prior to the mid-2000s. Indeed, rather than promoting the region’s 
uniqueness, Perm’s governor during the Perm-36 affair made no secret of his ambition to make Perm a 
region like any other in Russia. Consequently, the case provides useful insight into the ways that national 
regime context shapes the meaning and incentives for political action among regime subordinates. 
Crucially, the museum’s experience demonstrates that ideational power and patronage are not 
inseparable, and that elites find it difficult to dismiss legitimating ideas once engaged, regardless of their 
initial motivation. As a result, legitimating ideas can influence politics in unexpected ways and empower 
inconvenient allies. The next section presents the theoretical framework for examining authoritarian 
legitimation in terms of nationalist practices. The following section elaborates two scenarios for 
modeling legitimation in today’s Russia in relation to official patriotism and traces their alternation in 





Nationalism and Autocratic Legitimation 
In non-democratic regimes, the kinds of ideas that matter most to elites are those that help them to 
maintain their rule and that sustain the system of political order within which they exercise power.6 
Maintaining power is largely an elite game that only involves the masses at occasional intervals. At those 
moments, autocrats seek to mobilize their supporters while de-legitimating challengers by rendering 
alternatives to their continued rule to be unthinkable. Hence, challengers face selective attacks on their 
credibility that remove them as plausible alternatives to the regime. Outside of those infrequent 
moments in which regime incumbents seek to rally support, sustaining political order involves the 
ongoing legitimation of the regime. At the same time, autocrats maintain the existence of an opposition 
but ensure that it is not disruptive by keeping it de-mobilized. In this fashion, one might separate the 
ways that ideas matter in authoritarian politics in terms of their relationship to the goals of preserving 
the political order and maintaining power and their differential implications for the regime’s supporters 
as well as its challengers: maintaining order involves legitimation among supporters and de-mobilization 
of challengers, while maintaining power involves selective mobilization of supporters and de-
legitimation of challengers (see Table 1). 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Nationalism has proven to be a persistent and useful frame for legitimation and mobilization in 
post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. In the first place, the historically recent independence of post-Soviet 
states was established in the midst of anti-Soviet mobilization and framed in terms of national 
sovereignty.7 Second, post-Soviet societies continue to define and understand identity in mainly ethnic 
 
6 Steven R. Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and 
Authoritarian Durability,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 4 (2012): 869–89. 
7 Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge, UK, 2002). This was 
less the case in Belarus and Central Asian states, where independence was claimed later than other Soviet 
republics and nationalist movements failed to take power following independence. 
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terms, and in each state this quotidian reality stands at variance with the civic definitions of the nation 
claimed in post-Soviet constitutions. Third, this gap between informal and formal institutional realities 
extends broadly to the political realm as a defining feature of Russia and other post-Soviet electoral 
authoritarian regimes.8 In such regimes, ruling elites are sustained by mutual complicity in subverting 
the formal institutional order, while opposition challengers highlight this subversion and seek to restore 
the primacy of formal institutions. As a result, authoritarian legitimation arises less from perceptions of 
institutional procedures than from perceptions of regime practices – in other words, the rationale for 
political action matters more than its legality or institutional propriety, given the widespread awareness 
of the gap between pervasive informal practices and the formal institutional order and social 
expectations that the latter can always be tailored to fit the former.9  
Moreover, these shared expectations mean that public political struggles tend to be less about 
formal competition than about the significance of competing as a function of access and loyalty.10 In this 
sense, incumbents may regulate political competition by authorizing nationalist practices among 
subordinates and in society, or by endorsing (or co-opting) nationalist practices promoted by 
subordinates or opposition actors. Authorization of nationalist practices often comes in vague form and 
encourages competition among regime subordinates in the form of innovation or outbidding as they 
attempt to divine the autocrat’s true interest from various cues and signs. Similarly, endorsement of a 
 
8 Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance (New York, 2013); 
Stephen Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (New York, 
2010); Richard Sakwa, “The Dual State in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 26, no. 3 (2010): 185–206. 
9 This bears a similarity to T.H. Rigby’s characterization of legitimate authority in the Soviet Union as “goal-rational” 
rather than a Weberian “legal-rational” authority. T. H. Rigby, “A Conceptual Approach to Authority, Power and 
Policy in the Soviet Union,” in Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR: Essays Dedicated to Leonard Schapiro 
(London, 1980), 9–31. 
10 This paragraph and the next adapt the schema of regime, subordinate, and opposition practices introduced in: J. 
Paul Goode, “Nationalism in Quiet Times: Ideational Power and Post-Soviet Electoral Authoritarianism,” Problems 
of Post-Communism 59, no. 3 (2012): 6–16. 
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subordinate’s nationalist practice encourages their emulation (or concealment of non-conformist 
practices) by other subordinates (see Table 2).  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
For opposition actors, incumbents’ nationalist practices generate an inverse set of competitive 
and mimetic stances. The authorization of nationalist competition among subordinates provides the 
opposition with opportunities to expose the gap between formal and informal political orders, enabling 
anticipation and mockery of regime tactics through their emulation. By contrast, the endorsement of 
subordinate nationalist practices creates opportunities for exploiting populations denied rights or 
recognition when subordinates engage in mimicry and concealment. Such opportunities may entail 
forcing an awkward or damaging regime response through provocation or outbidding, especially for 
extremists open to the use of violence for political ends. 
In this fashion, the nationalist practices adopted by autocrats generate distinctive competitive 
or mimetic dynamics among subordinates and opposition. In contemporary Russia, nationalist practices 
were tacitly endorsed through the 2000s, then shifted to full authorization in the form of state 
patriotism after 2012. Already in his 1999 “millennium manifesto,” Vladimir Putin called for a revival of 
patriotism along with establishing a strong state and cultivating great power status as a way of restoring 
social unity through such traditional Russian values.11 Upon coming to power, however, the Kremlin 
devoted little attention to patriotism, and few regime subordinates were willing to innovate in 
patriotism – unsurprising given that the regime appropriated many of the mainstream opposition’s 
nationalist platforms.12 By contrast, some opposition actors attempted to use patriotic displays to mock 
and expose the informal political order, as when Boris Nemtsov was arrested for “extremism” for 
 
11 Vladimir Putin, “Rossiia Na Rubezhe Tysiacheletii [Russia on the Eve of the Millennium],” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 
December 30, 1999, http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html. 
12 Marlene Laruelle, In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia (New York, 2009). 
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celebrating the anniversary of the defeat of the August Coup with the Russian tricolor flag.13 Some 
activists used new patriotic clubs more for interrogating the meaning of patriotism and exposing the gap 
between daily reality and the formal constitutional order than for cultivating regime loyalty.14  
While the Kremlin tolerated nationalist provocations as long as they could be regulated or 
contained, it moved quickly to suppress them after the Manezh Square riot in central Moscow in 2010.15 
Nationalist opposition increasingly fell out with the regime and made common cause with the liberal 
opposition in advance of the 2011-2012 electoral cycle, even joining in the mass protests for fair 
elections.16 In the aftermath, the Kremlin authorized significant resources for patriotic education, 
ceremonies, sporting events, youth clubs, art and media. Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, 
patriotism became the only game in town, with Putin declaring in 2016 that “we do not and cannot have 
any other unifying idea but patriotism” and stressing that “we do not intend to come up with another 
idea, and there is no need to do so.”17 Being a patriot became inseparably linked to regime loyalty in 
public politics and increasingly associated with Russian ethnicity in everyday life.18 The effect was to 
 
13 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 24, 2010. 
14 Anne Le Huérou, “Where Does the Motherland Begin? Private and Public Dimensions of Contemporary Russian 
Patriotism in Schools and Youth Organisations: A View from the Field,” Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 1 (2015): 28–48; 
Marlene Laruelle, “Patriotic Youth Clubs in Russia. Professional Niches, Cultural Capital and Narratives of Social 
Engagement,” Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 1 (2015): 8–27. 
15 Helge Blakkisrud, “Blurring the Boundary between Civic and Ethnic: The Kremlin’s New Approach to National 
Identity under Putin’s Third Term,” in The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 
2000-2015, ed. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 249–74. 
16 Pål Kolstø, “Marriage of Convenience? Collaboration between Nationalists and Liberals in the Russian 
Opposition, 2011–12,” The Russian Review 75, no. 4 (2016): 645–63; Nicu Popescu, “The Strange Alliance of 
Democrats and Nationalists,” Journal of Democracy 23 (2012): 46–54; Natal’ia Iudina, Vera Al’perovich, and 
Aleksandr Verkhovskii, “Mezhdu Manezhnoi i Bolotnoi: Ksenofobiia i radikal’nyi natsionalizm i protivodeistvie im v 
2011 godu v Rossii [Between Manezh and Bolotnaya: Xenophobia, radical nationalism, and efforts to counteract 
them in 2011],” SOVA Informatsionno-analiticheskii tsentr, February 24, 2012, http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-
xenophobia/publications/2012/02/d23739/. 
17 “Putin Rasskazal o National’noi Idee Rossii [Putin Discussed Russia’s National Idea],” RIA Novosti, February 3, 
2016, https://ria.ru/society/20160203/1369184806.html; Vladimir Putin, “Vstrecha s aktivom Kluba liderov 
[Meeting with members of the Club of Leaders],” Prezident Rossii, February 3, 2016, 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51263.  
18 Yuri Teper, “Official Russian Identity Discourse in Light of the Annexation of Crimea: National or Imperial?,” Post-
Soviet Affairs 32, no. 4 (2016): 378–96; J. Paul Goode, “Everyday Patriotism and Ethnicity in Today’s Russia,” in 
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compel regime subordinates to display their patriotic credentials while boxing out the liberal opposition 
and dividing nationalists.  
 
“Patriotism without Patriots” vs “Patriotism without Patronage” 
While this analytical framework provides a means to understand the uses of nationalist legitimation for 
the purposes of preserving order and maintaining power, it has a significant advantage over approaches 
that emphasize formal institutions or patronage in that it provides a means to account for the 
interaction of material and ideational sources of power: in brief, material resources flow from the 
nature of their attachment to particular ideas. Where the Kremlin plans and authorizes patriotic 
practices, resources tend to follow in the form of budget outlays, presidential grants, federal 
subventions, or rents. Where resources or rents are already in place, endorsement encourages 
subordinates to defend their status and fend off potential questions about their loyalty or performance.  
The ensuing scenario might be referred to as one of patriotism without patriots, in which official 
patriotism serves as a mechanism for coordinating and incentivizing elite competition largely through 
material and status inducements. In other words, this form of patriotic legitimation veers closest to the 
popular notion of patriotism as the “last refuge of a scoundrel,” providing no positive role for the 
masses aside from supporting the regime and opposing its challengers. Patriotism without patriots has a 
long tradition in Russia, satirized by the intelligentsia during the 19th century as “bureaucratic 
patriotism” [kazennyi patriotizm] in reference to the kind of patriotism invoked by the state’s agents 
when attacking the regime’s opponents.19  It is this variety of cynical, public patriotism that often leads 
 
Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010–2017, ed. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud 
(Edinburgh, 2018), 258–81. 
19 M. P. Odesskii and D. M. Fel’dman. “Ideologema ‘Patriot’ v Russkoi, Sovetskoi i Postsovetskoi Kul’ture. Lozung i 
Rugatel’stvo [The Concept of ‘Patriot’ in Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture: Slogan and curse word],” 
Obshchestvennye Nauki i Sovremennost’, no. 1 (2008): 109–23. 
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observers to dismiss ideas rather than recognizing them as order-preserving and power-maintaining 
resources.  
However, one must also account for scenarios in which patriotic practice does not benefit from 
patronage and may even threaten existing patronage streams or political status, or what one might 
simply term patriotism without patronage. In this scenario, patriotism is an ideational source of 
legitimacy existing autonomously of regime and its resources. Moral authority and the resonance of 
patriotic claims are key to perceptions of one’s right to invoke this form of patriotism, as well as the 
popular success or resilience of patriotic appeals. At a common sense level, moral authority stands in 
opposition to material exchange or commodification of patriotism—even where supported by significant 
state or private investment. The St. George ribbon [georgievaskaia lentochka] provides a vivid 
illustration: though introduced by state media and backed by a corporate sponsorship campaign, its 
status and utility as a patriotic symbol became bound to the notion that it is “nonexchangeable.” 
Campaign organizers even threatened moral condemnation of companies attempting to attach the 
ribbon to goods and services.20  
This mode of legitimation further prompts the regime’s endorsement of patriotic practices 
arising outside of its control, including attempts to co-opt opposition actors. When the regime rewards 
patriotic practice with its endorsement, however, elites fall over themselves to emulate or even to claim 
credit for its success. In time, endorsed practice becomes absorbed into regime politics and becomes 
routinized, authorized practice. A prime example is found in the “Immortal Regiment” [bessmertnyi 
polk], which began as a grassroots movement that contended with the government’s official celebration 
of Victory Day (May 9th). As it spread, however, it quickly received government endorsement and then 
was effectively co-opted with the top-down organization of Immortal Regiments and their official 
 




integration with May 9 parades.21 Framed in this manner, it becomes possible to disentangle the 
relationship between the power of ideas from the power of patronage. Moreover, analytically 
distinguishing between patriotism without patriots and patriotism without patronage suggests a range 
of possibilities that would be difficult for patronage-based approaches to explain, including situations in 
which regime incumbents or subordinates act contrary to their material interests, or when ideas 
become impossible to abandon even after they cease to be useful for maintaining power.  
In the following section, a case study of the museum for victims of political repression known as 
Perm-36 provides insight into these dynamics of ideational power and legitimation under 
authoritarianism.22 Founded in 1994, the museum was built on the site of one of the last Gulags 
designated for the incarceration of political prisoners. After twenty years of relatively peaceful co-
existence with regional and federal authorities, the museum came under a series of attacks from the 
regional government, fringe communist groups, and even national media, allegedly for unpatriotic 
distortions of history and promotion of opposition agendas. In short order, the museum was taken over 
by the regional government and transformed into a museum celebrating the Gulag system and its 
guards rather than memorializing victims of political repression.  
At first glance, patronage appears to be an obvious motivation for the regional government – 
specifically, the attacks started in earnest following the promise of approximately 600 million rubles in 
federal funding, yet they continued even after the prospect of federal patronage disappeared. 
 
21 Peter Hobson, “How Russian Authorities Hijacked a WWII Remembrance Movement,” The Moscow Times, May 
6, 2016, https://themoscowtimes.com:443/articles/how-russian-authorities-hijacked-a-wwii-remembrance-
movement-52776. 
22 Local press accounts were accessed via the Integrum full-text database. While seeking a balanced range of 
sources, the most comprehensive coverage was provided by the business daily Novyi Kompan’on. The timeline of 
events was triangulated with other federal and regional news sources, though duplicate stories are not cited here. 
Other press sources used in compiling this timeline include: Argumenty i Fakty—Prikam’e, Chusovskoi Rabochii, 
Ekho Moskvy v Permi, Kommersant—Perm’, Komsomol’skaia Pravda—Perm’, Permskii obozrevatel’, Rossiiskaia 
Gazeta—Iuzhnyi ural, and Zvezda. Interviews were conducted by the author in Perm’ in 2015.  
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Moreover, the attacks did not clearly benefit any group in the region as national and even international 
attention only served to push Perm down ratings of regional stability while estranging its governor and 
cultural minister from the region’s political and cultural elite, eventually even falling afoul of the 
Kremlin.  
The analysis of the regional government’s attack on Perm-36 is presented in three phases 
corresponding with the scenarios discussed, above: the museum’s origins, its emergence as an 
opposition platform, and initial attacks by regime subordinates (patriotism without patronage); the 
regional government’s attempt to take-over the museum and the intensification of attacks following 
Crimea (patriotism without patriots); and the slow war of attrition that followed to the completion of 
the government’s take-over (patriotism without patronage). The case study thus illustrates how ideas 
can empower opposition in ways that compel regime responses, but also bind regime subordinates to 
policies long after they cease to yield any material benefits. 
 
“Patriotism without Patronage” (I): Origins, Rise, and Initial Attacks on Perm-36  
During the Soviet era, Perm-36 was established as a prison colony in 1946 near the village Kuchino, in 
the Chusovksii raion of what would become Perm krai. From 1953, the camp was used primarily for 
holding NKVD officers who had been blamed for Stalin’s repressions. In 1972, the camp’s designation 
was changed by Iurii Andropov to hold dissidents who were brought to Perm-36 from different regions 
like Mordovia. From 1972 until its closing in 1988, approximately 40% of prisoners in Perm-36 were 
political prisoners sentenced for anti-Soviet agitation.23 According to historian and museum co-founder 
Viktor Shmyrov, members of nationalist movements—Russian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian—represented one 
 
23 Author’s interview with Tat’iana Kursina, former co-director of Perm-36, Perm’, December 3, 2015. 
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of the largest categories of prisoners (about 18%), though they tended to be non-violent dissidents since 
those who actually took up arms against the Soviet state were usually executed.24 In 1992, a series of 
conferences involving historians and former prisoners were held by the non-governmental organization 
Memorial. From there, the idea of building a museum for victims of political repression was hatched by 
Shmyrov and Sergei Kovalev, a human rights activist and former prisoner of Perm-36.  
The museum opened in 1994 with the help of private donations which later were supplemented 
from the regional budget. Its remote location made Perm-36 difficult and time consuming to reach, 
located over 100 kilometers from the regional capital along roads that had potholes the size of small 
cars.25 The directors struggled to piece together funding for both exhibits and for renovating the camp’s 
original buildings, which had fallen into disrepair since the camp’s closing, as most charitable funds 
prohibited the use of grants for remodeling buildings. Shmyrov related that former Soviet dissidents 
initially distrusted the museum, concerned that it might be seeking to profit from the memory of their 
repression. Consequently, the museum initially was supported by former Ukrainian dissidents.26 It also 
relied heavily on external grants and private donations from a variety of sources, including even $28,000 
from the US State Department – a source that would look suspicious for the museum’s opponents in 
2014, but did not draw attention at the time.27 The museum was rarely mentioned in the local press 
except to note that it had become one of the region’s top attractions, especially for international 
tourists.28  
The museum’s public profile started to rise in 2005, holding a civic forum called Pilorama 
(named after the camp’s wood cutting station). The forum was attended by former prisoners and aimed 
 
24 Ekho Moskvy v Permi, Perm’, March 9, 2015.  
25 Author’s field observation, Perm’, November 7, 2001. 
26 Quoted in: Zuzanna Bogumił, Gulag Memories: The Rediscovery and Commemoration of Russia’s Repressive Past 
(New York, 2018), 155. 
27 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, October 11, 2005. 
28 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, September 28, 2004; Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, October 26, 2004. 
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to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the museum’s founding with “civic songs,” though it was anybody’s 
guess what that meant.29 Pilorama became an annual festival, quickly growing in size and popularity. In 
2008, it featured former prisoners who had protested the crushing of the Prague Spring by Soviet troops 
in 1968 and attracted participants from seven regions, as well as international representatives from 
Germany, Lithuania, and the United Nations.30 By 2009, its program was headlined by a concert by pop 
musician Iurii Shevchuk with the festival attracting over 10,000 participants, notably including Perm’s 
Governor Oleg Chirkunov, Minister of Culture Boris Mil’gram, Human Rights ombudsman Tat’iana 
Margolina, and chairman of Perm’s Civic Forum Igor’ Averkiev.31 Pilorama became one of the region’s 
marquee events such that the 2010 festival, dedicated to the 80th anniversary of collectivization, 
included fifteen rock-collectives, twelve singer-songwriters, seven theaters, seventeen films, three 
performances, six poetry readings, ten exhibitions, ten group discussions, and four special events.32 
Official support for the museum continued to grow, with 15 million rubles earmarked for museum 
improvements and renovations from the 2011 regional budget.33   
As an ideological project, Pilorama as well as the museum’s other projects emphasized 
individuality and accountability over conformism and loyalty to the state. For the museum’s co-director, 
Tat’iana Kursina, Perm-36 had little to do with either the state or patronage: 
We are a patriotic museum. We do it so that citizens of our country, themselves, can tell how, 
during desperate, difficult times, there were examples…of such personal dignity, that one 
cannot be silent about them. And the power of the place is precisely found in the fact that the 
 
29 It was decided informally that “the singers should sing what they think they need to sing, and that would make 
them civic.” Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, September 20, 2005. 
30 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 22, 2008. 
31 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 28, 2009. 
32 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 20, 2010. 
33 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, September 14, 2010.  
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totalitarian, Stalinist system failed despite its extraordinary power, extraordinary methods for 
the efficient poisoning of humanity…34 
Perm-36 thus exemplified a form of patriotism without patronage. With the museum’s rising notoriety 
and the success of Pilorama, it quickly became a platform for Russia’s political opposition. As early as 
2006, the museum hosted a public forum on “Parliamentarism, Democracy, and Law,” organized by 
Nikita Belykh (the local head of the party Union of Right Forces), at which the region was criticized for 
tumbling down ratings of regional democracy in Russia.35 By 2011, Pilorama was dedicated to the theme 
of “20 years after the USSR: losses and gains,” with planned participation of anti-corruption activist and 
opposition figure Aleksei Naval’nyi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and films about imprisoned oligarch Mikhail 
Khodorkovskii and the late investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaia.36  
Not everyone was pleased about this transformation of the Perm-36 museum into a symbol for 
Russia’s political opposition, including residents of the village of Kuchino. Even within the Memorial 
organization, divisions began to emerge over the museum’s professionalization and institutionalization, 
which some viewed as weakening the principle that the history and lessons of the Gulag should be 
learned through individuals’ direct participation.37 The first political attacks on Perm-36 emerged from 
within the regional administration and targeted the museum’s budget. On the administrative front, the 
museum was charged with violating its terms of operation as an NGO, with the regional Ministry of 
Justice alleging that its directorship was improperly formed in 2008 and that all subsequent decisions 
made by the museum were invalid. This technicality jeopardized 10 million rubles in funding received 
from foreign sources in 2010 for Pilorama and other activities. The museum was also charged with 
failing to pay taxes on donations from foreign donors – namely, the American-based International 
 
34 Author’s interview with Kursina. 
35 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, May 23, 2006. 
36 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 12, 2011. In the end, Naval’nyi and Gorbachev chose not to attend. 
37 Bogumił, Gulag Memories, 155–60. 
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Coalition of Sites of Conscience and the National Endowment for Democracy – in the amount of 
$135,000. The charges effectively suspended the museum’s operations until they could be resolved.38  
A second attempt on the museum’s budget was made in 2012 when regional parliament deputy 
Aleksandr Telepnev accused Perm-36 of distorting historical facts and receiving significant money from 
abroad. He called for cutting regional funding for the museum from 24 million rubles to 9 million, 
though his call was not supported by other deputies or by the regional administration. In response, 
Shmyrov confirmed that only half of the museum’s budget came from the region (most of it for upkeep 
of facilities), while the rest was provided by external donors that included George Soros as well as 
Putin.39  
The same year, the attacks on the museum turned ideological with the publication of a 
controversial interview with Vladimir Kurguzov, a veteran prison guard from Perm-36 who accused the 
museum of distorting the camp’s history. Kurguzov claimed that all prisoners had been Forest Brothers, 
Banderites, and “our Russian traitors” (in reference to the nationalist dissidents imprisoned for anti-
Soviet activities) who sold secrets to other countries; that anti-Soviet agitators had been supported by 
foreign powers while they were in the camp; that prisoner treatment was “ideal”; and that the 
museum’s directors were financed by the West with the aim of brain-washing Russia’s youth.40  
The museum was next targeted by the neo-communist group Sut’ vremeni (Essence of Time, or 
EoT).41 Initially, it focused on opposing the so-called “cultural revolution” in Perm led by artist Marat 
Gel’man, the changing of Soviet-era street names, and opposing “orangeism” (in reference to the mass 
 
38 Kommersant-Perm’, Perm’, August 12, 2011.  
39 Kommersant-Perm’, Perm’, November 22, 2012. 
40 Argumenty i Fakty – Perm’, Perm’, July 25, 2012.  
41 The group describes itself as motivated by “the development of the communist ideal in the 21st century and the 
search for a synthesis of the red project with national traditions,” positions itself as a “left-patriotic force,” and 
views its historical mission as advancing the “USSR 2.0” project. 
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protests of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution”) in the regions.42 In short order, it focused its attention and 
resources on Perm-36. Initially it formed an “anti-Pilorama” group outside of the festival in 2012, later 
publishing a series of interviews with veteran camp guards in November-December 2012 under the 
rubric of “Perm-36. Truth and lies.”43 The interviews attacked the museum and its defenders, declaring 
the museum’s directors to be tools of the West, disputing claims about the treatment of prisoners, and 
alleging contacts between dissidents and CIA.  
 
“Patriotism without Patriots”: The Government’s Takeover Bid 
With the departure of Oleg Chirkunov and the appointment of Viktor Basargin as Perm’s governor, the 
regional administration turned from protector to predator. Perm-36 featured prominently in plans for a 
federal targeted program for “immortalizing the memory of victims of political repression,” spearheaded 
by chair of the Presidential Council for Development of Civil Society and Human Rights Mikhail Fedotov. 
The museum would become one of just three federal memorials (the others yet to be constructed in 
Moscow and Leningrad oblast’). The museum’s conversion from NGO to federal memorial would mean 
400 million rubles in federal funding and a further 160 million rubles in regional funding – a colossal 
amount for the museum. Around the same time, Kursina also was visited by a representative of the 
American firm Ralph Baum which was known internationally for the Holocaust Museum in Washington 
DC, the Freedom Bell in Philadelphia, Constitution Hill in South Africa, the Museum of Tolerance in 
Moscow, and most recently the Yeltsin Center in Ekaterinburg. The firm offered to join forces with the 
museum to turn Perm-36 into a world-class memorial and international tourist destination.44 
 
42 “Kto my [Who we are],” April 9, 2012. <http://eotperm.ru/?cat=7> Last accessed June 8, 2017.  
43 “Perm’-36. Pravda i lozh’ [Perm-36: Truth and lies],” November 21, 2012. <http://eotperm.ru/?p=639> Last 
accessed June 8, 2017. 
44 Interview with Kursina. 
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The newly-appointed Minister of Culture Igor’ Gladnev argued in June 2013 that the museum 
needed to be transformed first into a regional administrative entity before it could be included in the 
federal program.45 Shortly afterwards, EoT sent an open letter to Basargin declaring that Pilorama was 
clearly politicized, alleging that it was intended to destabilize the region, and demanding that it not be 
allowed to move forward. The regional Ministry of Culture suddenly sequestered half of the funds 
allocated for Pilorama from the regional budget (2.5 million rubles), forcing organizers to cancel the 
festival just two weeks before it was to start.46 According to the museum’s co-director Tat’iana Kursina, 
the move came as a shock as the museum had been assured by the Ministry that Pilorama’s budget was 
safe.47 Nevertheless, the directors managed to make up the shortfall in the event budget with a private 
donation from businessman Evgenii Fridman, but the regional administration then failed to arrange 
security for the event.48  
The unfolding drama over Perm-36 within the region stood in stark contrast to its treatment in 
Moscow, where plans continued apace for Perm-36’s conversion into a federal memorial and tourist 
center. The museum even earned praise from the federal Finance Ministry for its unique system of 
state-private partnership in which state subsidies were about equal to private donations.49 The museum 
further received 1.9 million rubles in a presidential grant for the following year’s festival.50  
By the end of 2013, the regional Ministry of Culture moved ahead with creating a government 
entity to manage the museum’s property, claiming over Shmyrov’s objections that it was necessary for 
the museum’s participation in the federal targeted program.51 Elaborating on the need to divide the 
 
45 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, June 20, 2013. 
46 Kommersant-Perm’, Perm’, July 9, 2013. 
47 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 8, 2013. 
48 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 15, 2013. 
49 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, October 14, 2013. 
50 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, December 5, 2013. 
51 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, December 12, 2013. 
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museum’s projects and exhibitions as run by the NGO and the management of its property by the 
government entity, Basargin bluntly articulated the political rationale for the move: “If resources are 
located to bring foreigners to take part in meetings, for goodness sake, let them come. But this habit of 
coming here on our money and criticizing us… Well, as soon as we say, “you take responsibility,” that’s 
when the problems start.”52 The museum directors negotiated a division of labor between the 
government entity – now an autonomous government institution (GAU) – and the museum, formally an 
autonomous non-commercial organization (ANO), with the region guaranteeing that the GAU would not 
use “Perm-36” in its name and appointing Kursina to serve as its director to maintain continuity of 
operations with the museum.53  
 
From Crimea to the Kremlin: Patronage Denied 
Events once more took a turn for the ideological following the annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014, 
and Putin’s warning against the work of fifth columnists to undermine the country.54 EoT stepped up its 
public attacks on the museum, claiming that it taught school children that Russia was a criminal state 
and that Ukrainian wartime nationalist Stepan Bandera was a hero.55 When pressed by the chair of 
Perm’s Civic Chamber, Igor’ Averkiev, to name those he considered to be “national traitors,” the 
movement’s activist Pavel Gur’ianov declared any list must include “the directors of the pro-Banderite 
museum Perm-36, which teaches Perm’s children that Bandera was a hero in the struggle against 
 
52 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, January 14, 2014. 
53 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, January 16, 2014; Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, February 11, 2014. 
54 Vladimir Putin. “Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Address by the President of the Russian 
Federation],” Prezident Rossii, March 18, 2014. http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/20603. 
55 Bandera was a controversial leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) that fought against the 
Soviet Union for Ukrainian independence in the 1930s-1940s, including during Nazi Germany’s occupation of 
Ukraine. In the wake of Ukraine’s “Revolution of Dignity” in 2013-2014, Russian state media frequently referenced 
the new regime’s celebration of Bandera (hence the term “Banderites”) as evidence of its allegedly Russophobic 
and fascist nature.  
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Russian occupation…”56 Within a month, the regional government turned off the museum’s electricity 
and withdrew its funding for Pilorama.57 Finally, while Shmyrov was hospitalized with a heart ailment, 
Kursina was fired as director of the GAU at the end of May 2014 and replaced by Deputy Culture 
Minister Natal’ia Semakova.58  
The museum’s operations ground to a halt since the GAU could not use the museum’s exhibits 
(which belonged to the ANO) while the ANO could not use the museum’s territory (which now belonged 
to the GAU) to conduct its activities.59 While the museum was closed, however, a television crew 
somehow gained access and filmed former prison guards complaining about the museum’s distortions 
of history as they toured its exhibits.60 In a pair of NTV documentaries that were broadcast nationally in 
early June 2014, the museum was alleged to have been built with money from the US and Soros, to have 
misrepresented nationalists as “prisoners of conscience,” and to have deceived students. The programs 
also featured covert footage of an unidentified tour guide saying that the Soviet-era prison wardens 
were worse than fascists. Kursina was asked leading questions and smeared by implication.  
The allegations in the NTV broadcasts were so shocking that they provoked an investigation of 
the museum directors by the Center for Counteracting Extremism (known colloquially as “Center E”). 
Commenting on the investigation, Averkiev expressed doubt on the possibility of any kind of conspiracy: 
“It’s just the way things are now, that any patriotic idiocy can have unintended consequences. Probably 
everyone understands that it’s nothing, but that one cannot fail to react to such signals.”61 In 
 
56 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, March 25, 2014; Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, March 26, 2014. 
57 Kommersant-Perm’, Perm’, April 30, 2014; Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, May 21, 2014. 
58 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, May 23, 2014. 
59 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, May 26, 2014. 
60 “Sponsory iz SShA otkryli v Permi muzei “natsionalistov-muchenikov” Ukrainy [American sponsors open a 
museum of Ukraine’s “nationalist martyrs” in Perm],” NTV.ru. June 3, 2014. <http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1010037> 
Last accessed June 8, 2017; ““Piataia kolonna” proslavliaet banderovtsev na den’gi SShA [“Fifth column” glorifies 
Banderites with American money],” NTV.ru. June 7, 2014. < 
http://www.ntv.ru/peredacha/professiya_reportyor/m720/o260436/video/> Last accessed June 8, 2017. 
61 Kommersant-Perm’, Perm’, August 26, 2014. 
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commenting on the situation, a member of Perm’s Civic Chamber and museum supporter, film director 
Pavel Pechenkin, even sympathized with the regional government: “It’s easy to understand the 
governor’s administration: they’re worried that some sort of State Department contagion will reach us 
through Perm-36. Like in Ukraine. …But there is no alternative to the museum’s existence in Perm krai. 
The museum must exist.”62 The museum was later cleared of the extremism charge.63  
As for the originators of the political signal provided by the broadcasts, the programs strongly 
suggested collusion between EoT and the regional administration. EoT activists were prominently 
interviewed during the program, among them Gur’ianov (though he was given the pseudonym of 
“Kuprianov” in the second program). Some of the prison guards in the broadcast previously provided 
interviews on EoT’s website. It is not clear who the tour guide was (given that the museum was closed) 
or who provided the former prison guards and camera crew with access, though they could only have 
gained entry with permission of the regional government since it controlled access to the museum’s 
territory. Additionally, a member of the entourage in the scandalous tour footage visibly wore a red 
jacket with EoT’s “USSR 2.0” slogan.64  
According to Aleksei Simonov, president of the Glasnost Defense Fund and governing chairman 
of the ANO Perm-36, the Kremlin was stunned by the broadcasts as well as the earlier appointment of 
the inexperienced Semakova as director of the GAU. The museum’s supporters quickly organized a 
meeting in the Presidential Administration. The governor’s chief of staff, Aleksei Frolov, was directed to 
 
62 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, August 29, 2014. 
63 Kommersant-Perm’, Perm’, October 3, 2014. It is perhaps worth noting that the museum was actually cleared on 
a technicality: the tour guide was ruled to have made extremist statements, but the statements pre-dated the 
adoption of amendments to the Criminal Code under which the museum could be prosecuted. In other words, the 
NTV broadcast was treated as legitimate by the authorities and the museum was still attributed with having 
promoted extremism. 
64 Gur’ianov later denied any involvement by EoT, claiming that the broadcasts were produced by those “who had 
seen actual preparations for a fascist maidan in Russia, and decided to warn society rather than wait for a coup 
along the lines of a ‘Kyiv scenario’.” Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, January 23, 2015. 
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produce a new draft agreement to govern relations between the GAU and ANO, who in turn promised 
to unlock all subsidies and to restore utilities service for the museum.65 Later that summer, Fedotov 
discussed the situation with Putin, recommending that the GAU be dissolved and its budget transferred 
as subsidy to the ANO. Putin even appeared to agree.66 But just as Moscow’s intervention seemed to 
work to the museum’s advantage, the federal Ministry of Culture suddenly announced it would no 
longer be responsible for the federal targeted program.67 With responsibility for the program passing to 
the Ministry for Regional Development—which had been run by Basargin prior to his appointment as 
Perm’s Governor and, unsurprisingly, had no real interest in memorials—the program was instead 
transformed into a state policy concept. This situation was an enigma for Perm’s administration: no 
longer was there any guarantee of ample federal funding for the museum, nor was there a clear signal 
for how to proceed.68 In effect, this development on the federal level marked the end of any prospect of 
patronage from the region’s takeover of Perm-36, though it did not halt the campaign.69  
“Patriotism without Patronage” (II): War of Attrition 
In the ensuing months, the regional administration outwardly complied with the Kremlin while 
repeatedly delaying negotiations over the promised draft agreement or attempting to divert them 
through the GAU. At the same time, the region’s Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Justice waged a war 
of attrition on the museum, attacking its finances, infrastructure, and the very content of its exhibits. 
Numerous cases were brought against the museum in Arbitrazh Court for non-payment of wages.70 
 
65 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, June 18, 2014. 
66 “Rabochaia vstrecha s Predsedatelem Soveta po pravam cheloveka Mikhailom Fedotovym [Working meeting 
with Human Rights Council Chairman Mikhail Fedotov],” Prezident Rossii. July 29, 2014. < 
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46372> Last accessed June 8, 2017. 
67 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, June 25, 2014. 
68 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, March 11, 2015. 
69 The museum was not even mentioned in the government concept for memorializing victims of political 
repression adopted in 2015 (http://www.president-sovet.ru/documents/read/393/#doc-1), nor was it listed on the 
corresponding government Foundation site (memoryfund.ru) or the related site of the Association of Museums of 
Memory (memorymuseums.ru). 
70 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 1, 2014. 
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Semakova also petitioned the court to cancel the 2011 agreement giving the ANO unfettered use of 
museum property, alleging that the ANO was not maintaining the property and had not installed fire 
alarms.71 In mid-July 2014, Kursina arrived at the museum to find workers destroying the camp’s intake 
gates – an almost irreplaceable piece of the original structure, the restoration of which would cost 1.2 
million rubles.72 Not trusting the regional administration to leave the museum’s exhibits intact, Shmyrov 
and Kursina evacuated the exhibits to Moscow for safe keeping.73  
The museum’s operations further became subject to regular administrative obstruction. The 
museum’s scientific director, Leonid Obukhov, claimed Semakova would not allow him to conduct an 
excursion for American and English colleagues.74 Police and Federal Migration Service (FMS) conducted 
visa inspections of German and Polish visitors to the museum. According to Obukhov, the local police 
confirmed the inspections were requested by Semakova.75 The regional administration complained that 
the ANO heaped slander and unfounded accusations on Semakova and the GAU, alleging that the 
museum was attempting to extort tens of millions of rubles from the regional government. It further 
announced that it had uncovered serious mismanagement by the museum, implying that further court 
cases were forthcoming.76 
Finally, the museum yielded to the attacks and announced that it would cease operations.77 
Shortly afterwards, the governor’s representative, Sergei Malenko, discussed the region’s future plans 
for the museum, revealing that it would include veterans of the prison service in developing new 
exhibits about the history of the Gulag.78 When later asked about the museum’s new direction following 
 
71 Kommersant-Perm’, Perm’, July 24, 2014; Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, November 26, 2014. 
72 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 16, 2014. 
73 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 22, 2014. 
74 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 1, 2014. 
75 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 22, 2014. 
76 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 23, 2014. 
77 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 25, 2014. 
78 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 28, 2014; Kommersant-Perm’, Perm’, July 29, 2014. 
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the takeover, Perm’s Culture Minister Igor’ Gladnev commented that working with prison veterans was 
essential for ensuring historical authenticity:  
We live in a great country, and many things happened in its history, which is why we shouldn’t 
hide the truth. If Perm-36 was where sentences were served by traitors and bandits who killed 
Soviet soldiers, officers, party members, families, and even children, then it must be said. And 
not pretend that Banderites in the 1940s were noble champions of freedom and 
independence.79 
From the government’s perspective, there was no contradiction between acknowledging the existence 
of political prisoners while collapsing the distinction between dissidents and criminals. In Averkiev’s 
characterization, however, this amounted to turning the museum for victims of political repression into 
“a museum about enemies of the people,” with just a tiny “dissidents’ corner” for its progressive 
international audience.80  
The museum’s defenders arranged another series of meetings in Moscow in the hope of saving 
the museum. Fedotov’s proposal of dissolving the GAU, previously approved by Putin, was rejected by 
the regional administration. Instead, it was agreed to form a new board that would guide the museum’s 
work, to be led by former Human Rights Commissioner Vladimir Lukin. It was also to include three 
members each from the ANO and GAU. The board would then oversee the drafting of a new agreement 
between the museum and the regional administration.81 Putin’s intervention was praised by Sergei 
Karaganov in the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights as a 
successful intervention that narrowly averted tragedy: 
 
79 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, January 22, 2015. 
80 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 29, 2014. 
81 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, September 8, 2014; Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, October 2, 2014; Kommersant-Perm’, 
Perm’, October 4, 2014. 
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More than two years ago at one of our meetings, you [Putin] ordered the preparation of a 
federal targeted program on this matter. And afterwards what transpired was worthy of 
Saltykov-Shchedrin. …The lack of a clear government position meant negative consequences. 
One of the most egregious, of course, was the near-death of one of the most important 
memorials to victims of political repression – the museum complex Perm-36. We thank the 
representatives of Your administration, who intervened on Your behalf and saved the museum 
after several tries.82 
Yet the celebration was premature. Despite the center’s intervention, the museum continued to suffer 
delays from the regional administration and assaults through the courts.  
First, the museum lost the suit brought by Semakova in July, meaning that the ANO no longer 
had the legal right to use the land and buildings of the museum.83 Later, the regional appeals court 
rejected Kursina’s petition and upheld her sacking as director of the GAU.84 In March 2015, the Ministry 
of Justice began an inspection of the ANO to determine whether it should be considered a “foreign 
agent.”85 The ANO’s archives were then sealed by local police in connection with the investigation, 
rendering them inaccessible at the same time that the Ministry of Justice demanded the ANO produce 
documents that could only be retrieved from its archives.86 Failing to present those documents, the 
Ministry of Justice moved forward with categorizing the ANO as a “foreign agent,”87 charged it with 
failing to register itself as such, and further charged it with failing to produce the required documents.88 
The regional Ministry of Culture followed up by suing the museum for failing to return state property (to 
 
82 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, October 15, 2014. 
83 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, November 26, 2014. 
84 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, December 15, 2014. 
85 Kommersant, Moscow, March 17, 2015. 
86 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, April 8, 2015. 
87 According to Kursina, the basis for claiming the museum undertook political activities was a journal dedicated to 
Pilorama that was published by the region’s human rights ombudsman. Interview with Kursina. 
88 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, April 21, 2015; Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, April 30, 2015. 
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which it had no access) in the amount of 1.5 million rubles.89 As it happened, the Ministry of Culture lost 
the suit, appealed, and lost again. The ANO successfully defended the charge that it failed to register as 
a foreign agent and the administrative fine was withdrawn.90  
Meanwhile, the regional administration continued to evade signing a draft agreement with the 
museum. When Lukin decided the governor’s office was sabotaging the process, he called for a new 
meeting in the Kremlin. Just after being summoned to Moscow, however, the governor’s chief of staff 
unexpectedly resigned, forcing postponement of the meeting.91 Lukin then attempted to organize 
another meeting of the board in Perm’, this time involving Volga Presidential Representative Mikhail 
Babich.92 On the eve of the meeting, the regional administration submitted a draft agreement that 
lacked guarantees for the preservation and ownership of the museum’s archives, resulting in another 
postponement.93 The practical effect of the various court cases as well as administrative obstruction was 
to prevent the ANO from formally dissolving, leaving it exposed to ongoing attacks that ultimately 
drained the last of its meager resources. 
 
Conclusion: Explaining the role of ideas in the takeover of Perm-36 
Most local supporters of the Perm-36 museum viewed the affair as a cynical and opportunistic move by 
the regional administration to seize control of a new patronage stream. In these accounts, the regional 
administration ran interference while the regional Ministries of Culture and Justice attacked the 
museum and its directors. While this explains the timing of the regional takeover of the museum, closer 
 
89 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, July 17, 2015. 
90 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, August 24, 2015; Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, October 8, 2015; Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, 
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scrutiny shows that an informal alliance between regional administration and self-styled patriots (mainly 
linked to EoT) sustained the attacks on the museum even after the patronage stream disappeared. The 
museum’s opponents focused on the its perceived distortions of history and damaging effect on 
patriotic education, later emboldened and seemingly authorized by Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. The 
foundation of opposition to the museum involved the demand that former prison guards be 
rehabilitated and included in the museum’s operations, and that all prisoners be treated as criminals 
regardless of whether they were dissidents, nationalists, thieves, Nazi collaborators, or murderers.94 
For the museum’s new scientific consultant, Mikhail Suslov, a crucial problem with the previous 
museum was not just the “tactless” politics of Pilorama, for which ran it afoul of the new regional 
government, but also its very approach to history: “…tell me, how can you inculcate patriotism on 
negative examples? They killed, punished, imprisoned…well, and repressed, deported, and so on. How 
can you raise a patriot on that basis?”95 In explaining the stakes involved in this approach to history and 
memorials, Suslov linked state patriotism to counteracting disintegrative tendencies (referring to 
Ukraine as a cautionary tale) and resisting Western aggression and the imposition of Western values.96 
He also took direct aim at Perm-36: 
If this memorial is financed [by the government], who and what will use it for the patriotic 
education of our youth? And will it achieve the opposite, that is, anti-patriotism? Does today's 
Russia need this, at a time when secret and open enemies of Russia are starting a new campaign 
against us?97 
 
94 More generally, this shift in focus is now reflected in the museum’s current exhibits, which showcase prison 
labor production and achievements and draw no distinctions between categories of prisoners. Author’s interview 
with Leonid Obukhov, former scientific director for Perm-36, Perm’, November 25, 2015. 
95 Author’s interview with Mikhail Suslov, current scientific consultant to Perm-36, Perm’, December 9, 2015. 
96 M.G. Suslov, “Patriotizm i problemy patrioticheskogo vospitaniia v sovremennykh usloviiakh [Patriotism and the 
problem of patriotic upbringing in contemporary conditions],” in Znat’, pomnit’, ne zabyvat’: Sbornik statei i 
materialov po voprosam patrioticheskogo vospitaniia, ed. E.P. Skachkova (Perm’, 2015), 5–28. 
97 Suslov, 19–20. 
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Perm’s Minister of Culture Gladnev similarly raised the connection between the museum’s “historical 
authenticity” and Russia’s very survival, focusing particularly on erasing the distinction between 
dissidents and ordinary criminals: 
In the course of historical events, there were those who were students of fascism, those who 
committed crimes, and those who defended their country, their motherland, and thought of the 
future of the nation, because the matter was simple: will Russia survive, will Russian language 
survive? Or would it have another fate - the fate of slaves, of a nation subordinated. And there is 
archival proof of this. There are orders and corresponding transcripts of conversations. This is 
why I don’t distinguish between those you call dissidents and those who were criminals. They 
were all criminals.98  
This existential tie claimed between the state management of Perm-36 and Russia’s very survival 
provides a vivid illustration of the extent to which regime subordinates and non-regime actors may be 
bound by ideas that are more robust and mobilizing than patronage.  
The transformation of Perm-36 thus begins and ends with competing understandings of 
patriotism, demonstrating the ways that ideational power constructs meaning and shapes political 
action in autocracies. Where regimes authorize or endorse nationalist practices, they encourage 
competitive and mimetic dynamics among subordinates seeking advancement and opposition seeking 
support. Where they authorize nationalist practices as a field for informal competition, subordinates 
attempt to innovate or outbid one another. Such competition creates opportunities for regime 
subordinates to co-opt outsiders or to ride on the coattails of innovators. By contrast, regimes 
 
98 Novyi Kompan’on, Perm’, October 2, 2015. 
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encourage conformity when they endorse existing practices, as subordinates aim to emulate those 
practices while concealing their failures. 
Of course, arguing that ideas are powerful in autocracies is not the same as claiming that all 
actors are principled. It is no secret that elites make opportunistic use of ideas to secure access to 
patronage when opportunities present themselves. Yet doing so also creates alliances and empowers 
constituencies for those ideas, making it difficult for elites to disavow or distance themselves from them 
after they cease to be profitable or useful. In the case of Perm-36, the nationalist turn in Russian politics 
in 2014 provided the regional administration with tacit authorization to turn patriotism into a foil for its 
takeover bid. The regional government’s actions emulated the rhetorical and coercive action endorsed 
by the Kremlin at the federal level in 2014, in turn co-opting EoT’s ongoing fight with the museum for its 
own purposes. For EoT, however, the shift in the national climate and alliance with the regional 
government meant that it was no longer a fringe actor but authorized to escalate its fight with the 
museum. Hence, patronage may explain the initial timing and incentive for the regional administration’s 
making common cause with EoT, but this informal alliance persisted well beyond the period of mobilized 
nationalism and even outlasted the prospect of federal patronage.  
In the aftermath of 2014, the regional administration’s alliances with nationalists like EoT 
remained binding and influential. Those seeking to move upwards or out of regional politics deflected 
blame or denied their roles in the debacle when called into the Kremlin, all the while concealing ongoing 
efforts to sabotage the museum. In practice, this also meant that their assault on the museum could not 
be called off without exposing certain ambitious actors' roles in the campaign. Hence, the rent-seeking 
interests in the regional administration that initially motivated the alliance with EoT were held hostage 
to their partners' ideological designs. In this manner, the constituencies for the ideas authorized or 
endorsed by the regime require ongoing accommodation, otherwise they threaten to expose rifts 
between state and society, region and federal center, and even among ruling elites. 
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The case study further suggests one of the principle mechanisms by which ideas become binding 
on regime subordinates and continue to exert an influence independently of material resources: when 
promoting the regime’s ideas is perceived to influence the career prospects of regime actors such that 
they are induced to form alliances during a mobilizational phase (power maintaining), those same ideas 
can continue to constrain or even dictate politics during quieter periods of legitimation (order 
maintaining) with potentially unpredictable results. In relation to Perm-36, key regional actors came to 
view existential concerns as both meaningful and compelling regardless of their access to federal 
patronage, even committing themselves to ideas that may actually have hurt their careers.99 
The Perm-36 affair thus highlights the potential risks and unintended consequences of 
nationalist legitimation, manifesting as unpredictable alliances and seemingly irrational action. The 
attacks on the museum were emboldened by the wave of official patriotism that swept Russia in 2014, 
but the Presidential Administration intervened (unsuccessfully) on several occasions to restrain the 
regional administration when it went too far. The regional government was warned repeatedly 
throughout the ordeal that the region was losing significant revenues from tourism and the governor’s 
reputation was declining as news of the attacks spread. Yet the administration’s takeover of Perm-36 
was pursued even after the potential for federal patronage disappeared and regional political sentiment 
started to turn against the regional administration. As if confirming the extent to which the governor’s 
administration had embraced official patriotism contrary to local political rationality, Aleksandr 
Telepnev – previously known for accusing the Perm-36 museum of distorting history and calling for its 
funding to be slashed – was appointed to run the regional administration’s program for patriotic 
education. The leader of United Russia’s fraction in the regional parliament, Iurii Borisovets, weakly 
 
99 A prime example is Perm’s governor during the Perm-36 affair, Viktor Basargin, who eventually resigned from 
office and was demoted to head the federal transportation oversight service, Rostransnadzor. 
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praised the appointment by calling it “age appropriate.” “But that’s what they decided,” he concluded 
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Table 1: Political Uses of Ideas for Regime Incumbents 
 
 Preserving Order Maintaining Power 
Regime Supporters Legitimation Mobilization 




Table 2: Regime, Subordinate, and Opposition Nationalist Practices 
 
Regime practices Subordinate practices Opposition practices 
Authorization 
 
 
Innovation 
Outbidding 
Mockery 
Exposure 
Endorsement Emulation 
Concealment 
Provocation 
Outbidding 
 
